While Trump raises doubt, the Europeans discuss their nuclear deterrent

The upcoming German adviser, Fredchich Mirz, the European pigeon position that flies in the departments of Matthew suggest Last month, this gave President Trump’s lack of confidence in President Trump’s commitment to NATO, who wanted to speak to France and Britain about extending nuclear deterrence to Germany.

Warning that “a profound change in American political geography”, Poland, as well as Ukraine, is in “more difficult situation”, Prime Minister Donald Tusk Poland He suggested the same thingWhile it hints that Poland, its long history of the Russian occupation, may ultimately develop its own bomb.

Then the President of Poland, Doda, said this week that the time has come for the United States to consider the re -spread of some of its nuclear weapons from Western Europe to Poland. “I think the time has come, but it will be safer if those weapons are already present,” Mr. Doda said Financial times.

The uproar was immediate, given the sensitivity and complications of the nuclear cause and the complete concept of extended deterrence-the preparation of a nuclear armed country to use its nuclear weapons to defend a non-nuclear ally. This commitment is at the heart of the fifth article of NATO, promising collective defense, and depends on the huge American nuclear arsenal.

Mr. Trump and his officials Say they remain committed To expand the American nuclear umbrella on Europe, the vital deterrent of any dangerous Russian aggression, and the alliance itself. But his clear hostility towards Europe has disturbed the traditional European allies in America to the point that it raised strong doubts that they could depend on the United States.

There are fears that a lot will talk about a European alternative, not to mention a single building attempt, Mr. Trump will not encourage his pledge. However, European allies are now participating in the most dangerous debate in generations about what the nuclear defense in Europe should be.

Like many things when it comes to European defense, Replace the American commitment It will not be easy.

Today, France and Britain are the only two Western powers in Europe who have nuclear weapons. For others, like Germany, joining the nuclear club will be expensive, and requires leaving the nuclear spread treaty and may seem more threatening to Moscow, which raises risks rather than lowering it.

But together, the French and the British do not have about 500 warheads compared to about 3,700 in the American arsenal, with 1,300 others pending the abolition of its activation. The Americans also have what is known as the “trio”-nuclear weapons on ground missiles, launchers and submarines.

The French have no wild missiles but they have nuclear equipped bombers and submarines, while the British only have submarines.

The French nuclear arsenal is only really independent of the United States, technically and politically. France has always refused to join the NATO nuclear planning group, while maintaining the only power to use its weapons in the hands of the French president, currently Emmanuel Macron.

The British deterrent depends on the American Trident II missiles, the launch of mechanisms and maintenance, which raises at least the issue of whether the British government has a complete authority to launch these weapons.

The French doctrine has always been a little mysterious, and it is part of the uncertainty that is the heart of deterrence. “We have a good idea of ​​what the French will not do, but this is not a clear understanding of what they want to do,” said Claudia Megor, head of security studies across the Atlantic Ocean of the German Marshall Fund.

Since 2020, Mr. Macron has sometimes spoke about France’s vital interests as a “European dimension”, without specifying what that is. Earlier this month, “a strategic discussion on the use of our deterrent to protect our allies in the European continent.”

“But to what extent does the” European dimension? ” I asked Ms. Megor. “The French will not determine it and of course you do not want Russia to know.”

Eric Jones, director of the Robert Shoman Center at the European University Institute, said that the security of neighboring Germany and perhaps Poland may be probably qualified as vital French national interests.

But it is clear that the traditional Russian rapid attack on Estonia or Lithuania will cause a French nuclear threat or response. “France’s vital interests do not reach this extent,” he said.

Cameel Grand, a former French defense official and NATO, said the French nuclear deterrent does not aim to provide an American -style US -style deterrent. But it provides another degree of uncertainty in Moscow, which is completed and even enhancing the NATO nuclear policy.

Since France and Britain are European, their national interests are likely to extend to the European neighborhood of what is for the United States far away.

Then there is the issue of the next French president. If Marin Le Pen, the head of the right -wing national gathering, may have a narrower vision of French interests. This can undermine the credibility of a French nuclear deterrent extending the same way in which Europeans are concerned about Mr. Trump’s commitment.

However, with both bombers and submarines, France maintains an escalation ladder “, with the ability to threaten without doing so. For example, in February 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, France put a third nuclear submarine to the sea,” a quiet but frank message that saw the Russians, “said Mr. Grand.

As suggested by Mr. Mirz and Polish leaders, France may also consider “nuclear participation”, as the Americans do now. There are five European countries – Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Turkey – which are currently hosting American B61 nuclear bombs and have their own planes to deliver them.

Poland would like to be the sixth. While Italy has been refused by Italy, for example, that France decides to place some of its nuclear weapons and explosives in other countries, it will serve as a break with its current belief. In any case, France and its president will keep full control of its use.

The submarines do not provide themselves as an escalation ladder, because they are supposed to remain hidden, either fire rockets or not. This is one of the reasons why British officials are considering restoring the air leg from their deterrent. Ideally, the British will also benefit from another submarine capable of the nucleus, so it can be more than one in the sea. But the expenses are enormous.

There is no way to share a submarine with another country, the way the bomb or the missile can be shared.

Evo Daldar, a former American ambassador in NATO, said, in the end, the essence of NATO Nato is still the United States.

The question for him is the lowest number of warheads of deterrence. “How do you make a deterrent Russia with credible when you are a distant environment and persuade the allies that you are ready to make their final sacrifice?” He asked. Unfortunately, Trump answers these questions without even raising them. “

Penner, director of the World Public Policy Institute, said, given every uncertainty, Germany may have to go to the nuclear itself. He said: “The conversation has so far been limited to a German bomb on the sidelines, but it is now more prevalent.” But he prefers to discuss nuclear participation with France, with French bombers on German bases.

Matthew Kroong, a former Ministry of Defense official, directs the Scaroft Strategy and Security Center in the Atlantic Council, that the discussion was useful to make Europeans take the defense more seriously.

He said: “NATO allies must do a lot of nuts and nails for traditional defense, but some high-end things such as nuclear deterrence-only the United States cannot provide them.”

Mrs. Major has another, widely shared anxiety. She said: “The more we do the defense for us.” “But does he send the wrong sign and have the unintended result of America leaving? It is the argument that we fear a lot.”