The Congo Doctor of the conflict tests the Chinese diplomatic balance law

China’s efforts to build huge work interests across Africa were accompanied by an accurate policy to maintain neutrality – but the conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo caused a shift in its approach.

Rwanda has been widely accused of providing fighting in the mineral rich area, and Beijing, which has close relationships with Dr. Kongo and Rwanda, has joined in recent weeks to criticism.

But she is trying to walk on a diplomatic rope to maintain good relations with both countries, while continuing to run its business – and buy decisive metals.

For decades, China was keen not to take aspects of conflicts in Africa, to avoid causing problems that may interfere with its wide commercial interests.

So far, I have moved away from criticizing African governments for supporting participants in a conflict.

For example, China has little less than the chain of coups since 2020 in the Sahael region in West Africa, with the exception of urging leaders to consider the interests of the people.

Professor Zhou Yuuan, who specializes in African development and security at the Shanghai Institutes of International Studies (SIIS), says that Beijing has long followed the policy of non -interference in the internal affairs of another country.

Consequently, it avoids proposing solutions to conflicts, regardless of the call to diplomatic or political efforts by international organizations such as the United Nations or the African Union.

The turmoil of the Rwandan -Back M23 rebels in the east of Dr. Congo, raised its head again in 2021. The fighters lead the ethnic Tutsian who say they have taken weapons to protect the rights of the Minority Group – and because the Congolese authorities are retreating from a previous peace deal.

In its early comments on these developments, China itself restricts the unnamed “foreign forces” to provide support to M23 fighters.

But in the past few weeks, it has separated from its usual practice and referred to Rwanda by name.

This is followed by great gains by the M23, which has acquired the main cities of Goma and Bukavu since January.

“China is repeated that Rwanda will stop its M23 military support and withdraw all its military forces immediately from the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” said the Chinese Ambassador of the Chinese in February.

Professor Zhou notes that although it is important, “the drafting is generally still relatively moderate.”

“China hopes that Rwanda will stop supporting it, but it did not condemn it,” he says.

Nevertheless, shortly after that, China supported a decision of the United Nations Security Council calling for the defense forces in Rwanda to “stop support to the M23 and withdraw immediately from the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo without preconditions.”

According to Professor Zhou, China’s data is likely to have been paid by United Nations expert reports, That provided strong evidence of Rwanda’s support for M23.

“This is a fundamental consensus in the United Nations Security Council,” he added.

“The problem was continuing for a long time, and everyone knows in their hearts the basic situation. There is no longer needed silence.”

China’s mission did not respond to the United Nations or its embassy in London when they were asked why China criticized Rwanda.

But the decisive importance of the famous mineral wealth of Dr. Congo may be a factor.

The fighting in the east of Dr. Congo focused on the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu, the home of many Chinese gold mines.

How these mines were affected by the fighting is not yet clear.

The M23 also seized lands with COULAN mines, which import China in large sizes.

The metal tantalum, used in cars and daily electronics, is extracted from TV to mobile phones, from this raw, and DR CONGO is a source of 40 % of the world’s supply.

A United Nations expert said in December 2024 that the M23 had fled Kolatan to Rwanda from Dr. Kongo. He also pointed out that Rwanda Colatan’s exports increased by 50 % between 2022 and 2023.

Although Rwanda has its own coluine mines, analysts say it can explain this significant increase in production.

It is not yet clear whether the volume or price of the church imported by China has been affected.

Another mineral connects China from the Dr connection is cobalt, which is very important to make the lithium battery.

However, cobalt mining operations in China are primarily in the southern Congo, away from conflict areas in the east.

Dozens of Chinese companies, owned by many of them, also build roads, communications and electrical energy facilities at Dr Congo. But it seems that the influence on these activities has yet been minimal.

China provides weapons for both Rwanda and Dr. Congo.

During the past two decades, the Rwandan army has bought the Chinese armored vehicles, artillery and anti -tank missiles, according to the International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

China published a military attaché to the country for the first time in 2024.

While UN experts say the Rwandan army has armed M23, it is unclear whether the rebel group is using any Chinese weapons.

The Congolese Armed Forces bought holders of individuals and a Chinese drone.

They also own Chinese tanks, which were purchased in 1976 but were still being used in 2022.

It is reported that the drones, at least, were used in the battle against the M23.

The Rwanda Embassy in Beijing said that the relations with China remained “excellent and fruitful”, and Rwanda did not have to comment on China’s statement about fighting in the eastern Congo.

The Chinese ambassador to Dr. Kongo, Zhao Ben, held discussions with Congolese Speaker Sama Lukond in early February, but no details were published on the meeting.

The economic activities in China deepened in the two countries. Both are part of the China Belt and Roads Initiative, designed to imagine China near the world through investments and infrastructure.

In Rwanda, China funded stadiums, schools and highways. Chinese loans also funded infrastructure projects – a loan to finance the dam and irrigation system, with a value of 40 million dollars (31 million pounds), was confirmed in January.

For years, most of the goods imported to Rwanda came from China.

When it comes to economic relations in China with Dr Cong, the United Nations database shows that China has been for years as a business partner in DR CONGO.

China has made great lengths to ensure that Dr. Kongo’s mineral wealth is reached.

Loans of $ 3.2 billion (2.5 billion pounds) extended from the country between 2005 and 2022, according to the rules of the African Database run by the University of Boston, most of them to finance road construction and bridges, and the country’s electricity network.

China has funded and constructed other projects in Dr Congo, including hydroelectric power factories and dry port.

These investments may suggest that through long -term interests of China is to find a decision to conflict quickly.